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I. INTRODUCTION

The United States has engaged in the targeted killing of certain
members of al Qaeda both within the theatre of an actual war in
Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, and outside the theatre of war as a matter
of self-defense in areas such as Yemen, including the killing of United
States national Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen on September 30, 2011.' It has
been reported that the United States (U.S.) Executive had a secret June
2010 memorandum that sanctified the killing of al-Awlaki as a law of war
measure because he allegedly played a direct part in an alleged war between
the United States and al Qaeda and its affiliates.2 Under international law,
*

Mike & Teresa Baker Law Center Professor, University of Houston.

Martin Chulov, Al-Qaida Cleric Anwar al-Awlaki is Dead,says Yemen, THE GUARDIAN,
1.
Sept. 30, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011I/sep/30/anwar-al-awlaki-dead (last
visited Mar. 15, 2012).
2.
Charlie Savage, Secret US. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2011, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-madelegal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).
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is it possible for the United States to be at war with al Qaeda as such? In
any event, are laws of war and self-defense targetings of certain members
of al Qaeda in the theatre of the actual war in Afghanistan and parts of
Pakistan generally permissible? Outside the theatre of a real war, are the
targetings of some members of al Qaeda permissible as measures of selfdefense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter? During selfdefense targetings, is there a need to attempt to comply with general
principles of distinction among persons, reasonable necessity, and
proportionality and what others call the collateral damage rule? These and
related questions are explored below.
II. THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE AT WAR WITH AL QAEDA

A. TraditionalCustomary InternationalLegal CriteriaRegardingthe
Existence of War

Despite claims of the Obama Administration that the United States
campaign against al Qaeda is an armed conflict,' under traditional
international law the United States cannot be at war or involved in any form
of armed conflict with al Qaeda as such, although, the United States is
involved in a real war in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan within which
certain members of al Qaeda are lawfully targetable either because they are
direct participants in hostilities (DPH) or are direct participants in armed
attacks against United States military personnel and other United States
nationals that allow the United States to respond with military force in self-

3.
Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Obama's Mideast Speech (May 19,
2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/middleeast/20prexy-text.html (last
visited Mar. 13, 2012); Barack Obama, President, United States of America, Remarks by the President
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
on National Security (May 21,
(last visited Mar. 13, 2012);
press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/
Harold HongjuKoh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Obama Administration and International
Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm (last visited
Mar. 13, 2012) (claiming that "the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda,... they continue
to attack us" during "this ongoing armed conflict" . . . Harold Koh also rightly noted that certain
targetings of members of al Qaeda can be lawful measures of self-defense.); Savage, supra note 2 (If the
U.S. has been at war with al Qaeda, under the laws of war attacks on the Pentagon, the U.S.S. Cole, and
U.S. military and CIA personnel in Afghanistan would have been permissible if engaged in by
privileged fighters and were not otherwise impermissible under international law.); See also Jordan J.
Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 270-72, 275 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1520717 (last visited Mar. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Self-Defense Targetings]. As explained in Part II,
infra, in the theatre of a real war both the law of war and the law of self-defense provide a competence
to engage civilians who are directly participating in hostilities and/or armed attacks. Both paradigms
(i.e., the law of war and self-defense paradigms) are operative in a theatre of war.
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defense against those who are directly participating in the armed attacks
(i.e., those who are DPAA). 4 It is evident, therefore, that the laws of war
are not applicable with respect to United States targetings of members of al
Qaeda outside the context of an actual war and where they are not directly
participating in hostilities, for example, by issuing or transferring orders or
authorizations by cell phone or computer flash drives to others who are
within the theatre of an actual war and engaged in violence.
Under traditional international law, it is obvious that al Qaeda is not a
state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group. Indeed, al Qaeda is not known
to have even purported to have the characteristics of a state, nation,
belligerent, or insurgent. Under customary international law, an insurgency
is the lowest level of warfare or armed conflict, otherwise known as an
armed conflict not of an international character.s Under traditional legal
criteria used to determine whether an insurgency exists, the putative
insurgent group would need to:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Represent an identifiable group of people or to have a
relatively stable base of support within a given population;
Have the semblance of a government;
Have an organized military force and be able to field its
military units in sustained hostilities; and
Control significant portions of territory as its own. 6

The next highest level of warfare or armed conflict is a belligerency.
A belligerent must meet each of the four criteria noted with respect to an
insurgency as well as a fifth criterion-it must have recognition as a
belligerent, nation, or state, by a state that it is engaged in an armed conflict
with or by other states in the international community.7 A well-known
example of a belligerent engaged in an armed conflict to which all of the
customary laws of war applied was the CSA or the Confederate States of
America during the United States Civil War. It met the four customary

4.

See, e.g., Self-Defense Targetings,supra note 3, at 270-72, 275.

5.

See, e.g., JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAw 646-48, 651, 654 (3 ed., 2007) [hereinafter ICL]; Jordan J. Paust, Post 9/11 Overreaction and
FallaciesRegarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment,Judicial Review
of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335, 1341 (2004)
[hereinafter Overreaction].
6.
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, War and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War,
28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 326 (2003) [hereinafter War and Enemy]; Overreaction,supra note 5; ICL,
supranote 5.
7.
See, e.g., id. at 326, n.6. There is no magic number or percentage of states that must
recognize such a status.
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legal criteria and also had recognition as a "belligerent" by the United
States as well as by a few European states.
In contrast, al Qaeda has never met the legal criteria for insurgent
status and has certainly lacked any outside recognition as a belligerent,
nation, or state. In particular, al Qaeda does not have the semblance of a
government; does not have an organized military force; does not field
military units in sustained hostilities; and does not control significant
portions of territory as its own. 9 In view of the above, any fighting between
the United States and al Qaeda as such cannot amount to war or an armed
conflict, and therefore, cannot trigger application of the laws of war for
such purposes as targeting, capture, status, detention, treatment,
prosecution, and application of a law of war collateral damage rule.'o For
8.
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 666-67, 669 (1862) (addressing criteria for
belligerency status which include the need to "occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of
territory; have declared their independence; ... have organized armies; have commenced hostilities ...
[and] the world acknowledges them as belligerents."); NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-49 (2008) [hereinafter TARGETED KILLING]; ICL, supra note 5, at 645, 651,
657, 661; U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 13 §1.11(a)
(1956) ("The customary law of war becomes applicable to civil war upon recognition of the rebels as
belligerents.") [hereinafter FM 27-10]; Overreaction, supra note 5, at 1341 n.24. The Civil War
between the United States and the Confederate States of America is an example of a classic civil war
between a state and a "belligerent" which also has the status of an armed conflict of an international
character to which all of the customary laws of war apply.
9.

See, e.g., War and Enemy, supra note 6 at 326-27; Overreaction,supra note 5, at 1340-

42.
10.
Most writers agree that the U.S. cannot be at "war" or in "armed conflict" or "combat"
with al Qaeda as such, much less a mere tactic of "terrorism." See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 410 (2 ed. 2005) ("As for Al Qaeda members, they must be regarded as civilians
engaging in criminal activities"); Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1872-73
(2004); Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and al Qaeda Soldiers: Another View, 19 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 127, 152 (2003); Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 2461, 2503, 2511
(2008); Silvia Borelli, Casting Light on the Legal Black Hole: InternationalLaw and Detentions
Abroad in the "War on Terror", 87 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 39, 45 (2005); Michael Byers, Terrorism,
the Use of Force, and InternationalLaw After 11 September, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 401, 408 (2002);
David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 958 (2002); Chad DeVeaux, Rationalizing the
Constitution: The MilitaryCommissions Act and the Dubious Legacy of Ex Parte Quirin,42 AKRON L.
REv. 13, 16 n.l 1 (2009); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous
War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 347-48 (2002); Matthew Fleischman, A Functional
Distribution of War Powers, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 159 (2010); Christopher
Greenwood, War, Terrorism, and InternationalLaw, 56 CURRENT L. PROBS. 505, 529 (2004); Daryl L.
Hecht, Controlling the Executive's Power to Detain Aliens Offshore: What Process is Due the
Guantanamo Detainees?, 50 S.D. L. REv. 78, 94 (2005); Berta E. Hernandez Truyol, Globalizing
Terror, 81 OR. L. REv. 941, 972, n.140 (2002); Wayne McCormack, Emergency Powers and Terrorism,
185 MIL. L. REv. 69, 70, n.6 (2005); Jennifer Moore, PracticingWhat We Preach: Humane Treatment
for Detainees in the War on Terror, 34 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 33, 36 (2006); Mary Ellen
O'Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 349, 349-
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57 (2005); Mary Ellen O'Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myth of the Global War on Terror,
12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535, 538 (2005); War andEnemy, supranote 6, at 327; Michael Ramsden,
Targeted Killings and InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Case ofAnwar Al-Awlaki, 16 J. CONFLICT
& SEC. L. 385, 390 (absurd claim of a "global NIAC between the USA and Al-Qaeda, and such view
finds little support outside of the USA"); Gabor Rona, InternationalLaw UnderFire: InterestingTimes
for InternationalHumanitarianLaw: Challengesfrom the "War on Terror", 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., at 55, 61 (Summer/Fall 2003); Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, 83 FOREIGN
AFF., at 2, 7 (Jan./Feb. 2004); Leila Nadya Sadat, Terrorismand the Rule of Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REv. 135, 140 (2004); Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War on
Terrorism ", 22 LAW & INEQ. 195, 195-196 (2004); Scott Silliman, Testimony before the United States
Senate Committee on the Judiciary on DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending
Against Terrorism (Nov. 28, 2001) (U.S. not at war with al Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks could not be
violations of the laws of war); Detlev F. Vagts, "War" in the American Legal System, 12 ELSA J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 541, 543-45 (2006); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human
Rights Norms in ContemporaryArmed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,4 n.18 (2004); INT'L COMM. RED
CROSS, THE RELEVANCE OF IHL IN THE CONTEXT OF TERRORISM (July 21, 2005), available at
2
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/terrorism-ihl- 10705.htm (last visited Mar. 13,
at 1 (Dec. 14,2001) (quoting
MONITOR,
2012); Warren Richey, Tribunals on Trial, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
Professor Leila Sadat, "actions of Sept. 11 aren't war crimes . . . "), available at
http://www.publicbroadcasting.net/wvmr/news.newsmain/article/0/0/314920/Opinion/Tribunals.on.Trial
(last visited on Mar. 13, 2012). See also Mark A. Drumbl, Guantanamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of
Law, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 897, 908 (2005) (Bush policy had the unwanted consequence of "absurdly
glorifying terrorism as armed conflict and terrorists as 'warriors. . . .'); Kevin Jon Heller, The Law of
Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict with al-Qaeda,and It's a Good Thing, Too: A Response to
Chang,47 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 n.10 (2011) (stating that "[t]he idea that there is a global NIAC between
the U.S. and al-Qaeda is both legally questionable ... and has been consistently rejected by states other
than the U.S.," citing Kress, infra note 19 at 266); Jenny S. Martinez, Inherent Executive Power: A
ComparativePerspective,115 YALE L.J. 2480, 2500 (2006) (quoting Lord Hoffman in A (FC) & Others
(FC) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] UKHL 56, 96 "Terrorist violence, serious as it is, [is
not a] war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation"); Interview by Wolf Blitzer of
CNN with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Adviser (May 14, 2006) ("1 don't buy the
proposition we are at war. . . . [T]his is really a distortion of reality. We have a serious security
problem with terrorism .... But to create an atmosphere of fear, almost of paranoia, claiming that we're
a nation at war, opens the door to a lot of legal shenanigans." Without compliance with FISA, "[w]e
slide into a pattern of illegality"); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (O'Connor, J.) (rightly
classifying the war in Afghanistan as "[a]ctive combat operations against Taliban fighters" and
declaring that detention can last "for the duration of these hostilities Pan American Airways, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1013-15 (2d Cir. 1974) (United States could not have been
at war with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which had engaged in terrorist acts
as a non-state, non-belligerent, non-insurgent actor). Cf Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War
on Terror, 83 DENv. U. L. REV. 335, 337 n.6 (2005); Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One
Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay
Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149,189-90 (2005) ("important to distinguish the rhetoric of the
'war on terrorism' from the congressional authorization," "the current war on terrorism"). But see JOHN
Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 12-13 (2006) (recognizing that we cannot be at war with terrorism, but
claiming without consideration of even the customary legal criteria that must be met even for the
existence of an insurgency that we are "in an international armed conflict with al Qaeda"). See
generally, Jane Gilliland Dalton, What is War? Terrorism as War After 9/11, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 523 (2006); John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207 (2003);
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this reason, outside the context of an actual war to which the laws of war
apply, members of al Qaeda who were not otherwise attached to the armed
forces of a belligerent, nation, or state cannot be "combatants," much less,
"enemy," or so-called "unlawful" combatants or prisoners of war as those
terms and phrases are widely known in international law."
B. Newer Criteriain Geneva ProtocolII

One set of legal criteria for application of certain laws of war to an
insurgency is slightly different than that reflected in the Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 12 Article 1(1)
of the Geneva Protocol requires that there be an "armed conflict" between a
state's armed forces and at least an "organized armed group" that is "under
responsible command" and that "exercise[s] such control over a part of ...
[a state's] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement the Protocol." 3 It is evident that
outside the theatre of an actual war in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan, al
Qaeda does not engage in an "armed conflict" with military forces of the
United States; is not more generally an "organized armed group;" is not
under a "responsible" command;14 does not "exercise such control over a
part" of territory of a state as to enable al Qaeda "to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations;" and certainly does not intend to implement
the Geneva Protocol. In fact, al Qaeda does not carry out "sustained and
concerted military operations" anywhere around the globe. The Geneva
Protocol also recognizes that "isolated and sporadic acts of violence" are
not "armed conflicts" of any sort.'5

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006) (stating that Hamdan "was captured and detained
incident to the conflict with al Qaeda and not the conflict with the Taliban," but citing nothing for such a
notion of "conflict" and paying no attention to traditional law of war criteria for an insurgency or legal
criteria set forth in Geneva Protocol II noted infra).
11.

See, e.g., War andEnemy, supra note 6, at 327-33.

12. See Geneva Convention Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol 11].
13.

Id. art. 1(1).

14. See, e.g., Aaron M. Drake, Current US. Air ForceDrone Operationsand Their Conduct
in Compliance with InternationalHumanitarianLaw--An Overview, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 629,
654-55 (2011) (regarding general attributes of responsible command); Michael A. Newton, Flying into
the Future: Drone Warfare and the ChangingFace of Humanitarian Law, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 601, 606-07 (2011).
15.

Geneva Protocol II, supranote 12, art. 1(2).
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C An ICTY Preferencefor Lower Levels of Warfare
In 1995, an opinion of the Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) chose a much lower
threshold, preferring that "an armed conflict exists whenever there. is resort
to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between a
governmental authority and organized armed groups or between such
groups within a state." 6 This preference has been shared by some writers,
but is generally without support in continual practice and generally shared
patterns of legal expectation or opiniojuris- two elements needed for the
formation of a norm of customary international law17-and has no direct
support in treaty law. Even under this preference, however, it is evident
that al Qaeda is not an "organized armed group" and that outside the theatre
of the real Afghan war, al Qaeda does not engage in "protracted" armed
violence or "armed force" as opposed to sporadic or isolated acts of
violence, especially as such phrases have been further clarified in
subsequent cases.' 8 Responding to such a preference, other textwriters,
including those who participated in a report for the International Law
Association, underscore that protracted armed violence exists only where

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
16.
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995);
562 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment,
Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber II, May 7, 1997) ("terrorist activities . . . are not subject to
international humanitarian law."); Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tareulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T,
Judgment, | 175, 177-78 (Int'l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, July 10, 2008) ("the Trial
Chamber in Tadic interpreted this test . . . as consisting of two criteria, namely (i) the intensity of the
conflict, and (ii) the organization of the parties to the conflict" and "care is needed not to lose sight of
the requirement for protracted armed violence...when assessing the intensity of the conflict. The criteria
are closely related. . . ."); id. 185 (regarding "protracted" violence, what matters is whether the acts are
perpetrated in isolation or as part of a protracted campaign that entails the engagement of both parties in
hostilities," and quoting The Prosecutor v. Kordic: "[t]he requirement of protracted fighting is
significant."); id. % 199-203 (identifying various other factors); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No.
ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment, 248(Jan. 27, 2000) ("The expression 'armed conflicts' introduces a material
criterion: the existence of open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or
lesser degree. . . ."); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, ("isolated and sporadic acts of violence" are not "armed conflict"). Al Qaeda does not
engage in a "protracted campaign that entails engagement of. . . [other] parties in hostilities," "open
hostilities," or use "armed forces" in "protracted fighting." It should be noted that Professor Cassese, as
Judge in the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, wrote the opinion noted above in Tadic, and he later
recognized that members of al Qaeda are mere civilians engaged in criminal activities. CASSESE, supra
note 10, at 410.
17.

See, e.g., ICL, supra note 5, at 6-9.

18.

See, e.g., supra note 16.
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there is intense fighting.' 9 Clearly, al Qaeda does not engage in intense
fighting outside the theatre of the Afghan war and it is doubtful that al
Qaeda, as such, has ever done so in the theatre of war.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has defined
"organized armed groups" for a different purpose, i.e., for the purpose of
deciding whether particular persons can be targeted during an actual armed
conflict. In my opinion, the ICRC description of organized armed groups
should be useful for interpretation of the same phrase that was used in
ICTY decisions as well as their use of related phrases such as "armed
force" and "protracted armed violence." The ICRC has declared that
members of "organized armed groups" are members of "fighting forces"
composed "of individuals whose continuous function is to take a direct part
in hostilities-continuous combat function." 20 Using the ICRC's approach,
it is quite obvious that al Qaeda does not meet such a test for an "organized
armed group," since it does not have a "fighting force" composed of
individuals who have a "continuous combat function." 2 1
II. TARGETINGS OF MEMBERS OF AL QAEDA IN THE THEATRE OF A
REAL WAR

Even though the United States cannot be at war with al Qaeda as such,
some members of al Qaeda have been directly involved in ongoing
hostilities during the real war in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan. As
noted in another writing, members of al Qaeda within the theatre of such a
war who directly participate in hostilities, and those outside the general
theatre of war who directly participate in such a war, are targetable under

19.
See, e.g., Claus Kress, Some Reflections on the InternationalLegal Framework Governing
TransnationalArmed Conflicts, 15 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 245, 261 (2010) (the threshold "requires the
insistence on a degree of quasi-military organization of the non-State party that enables it to carry out
large-scale armed violence in a coordinated manner" and such does not pertain at least after "Al Qaeda's
subsequent transformation into a rather loosely connected network of terrorist cells"); Mary Ellen
O'Connell, Remarks: The Resort to Drones Under InternationalLaw, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
585, 596-97 (2011), citing Use of Force Comm. of the Int'l L. Ass'n, Final Report on the Meaning of
(2010),
available at http://www.ilaLaw
1
International
in
Armed
Conflict
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfn/cid/1022 (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter O'Connel, Remarks];
Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Choice ofLaw Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 343, 355-57
(2010). See also supranote 16.
20. See, e.g., Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participationin
Hostilities Under InternationalHumanitarianLaw, ICRC, 16, 27, 36, 70-73 (May 2009), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012)
[hereinafter Melzer, Interpretive Guidance].
21.

See id.
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the laws of war as civilians who directly participate in hostilities (DPH).2 2
As noted, whenever the United States uses armed force outside its territory
against an actual insurgent military force-and therefore, not in the case of
force used merely against al Qaeda as such-the armed conflict:
should be recognized as an international armed conflict to which
all of the customary laws of war apply. It is in the interest of the
United States and other countries to recognize the international
character of such an armed conflict so that members of their
armed forces have "combatant" status, prisoner of war status if
captured, and "combatant immunity" for lawful acts of warfare
engaged in during an international armed conflict.... The armed
conflict between U.S. military forces and those of the Taliban
inside and outside of Afghanistan since October 7, 2001 is an
international armed conflict. 23
III. TARGETINGS OF MEMBERS OF AL QAEDA CAN BE PERMISSIBLE As
MEASURES OF SELF-DEFENSE
Both within and outside the theatre of an actual war, some members of
al Qaeda can be targeted or captured as part of lawful United States
responses in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
against ongoing non-state actor armed attacks on the United States, its
embassies abroad, and its military personnel and other nationals abroad.24
There are no geographic limits to permissible self-defense targetings and
they can occur outside an actual theatre of war and in time of relative
22.
See, e.g., Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 3, at 270-72, 275; Jordan J. Paust,
Permissible Self-Defense Targetings and the Death of bin Laden, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y569,
571-72, 579 (2011) [hereinafter, PermissibleSelf-Defense Targetings]. As noted, one wants to consider
participation over a period of time or the process of participation over time, for example, by using a
movie camera instead of a rigid snap shot approach to inquiry and by noting whether there exists a
relatively continuous participation over time (with short interruptions). If so, it is appropriate to
conclude that there is a process of direct participation and one does not have to inquire merely whether
the next form of direct participation is imminent (which would involve a rigid snap shot approach) and
one can note that the process of participation realistically did not stop. See, e.g., Self-Defense
Targetings, supra note 3, at 271 n.90. This is somewhat different from the ICRC's notion of a
continuous combat function (CCF), which is also process-oriented. See, e.g., Melzer, Interpretive
Guidance, supra note 20, at 16-17, 27, 34, 36, 65-68, 70-73 (discussing the ICRC's CCF-type of
inquiry); Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 3, at 271-72 n.90.
23.

Self-Defense Targetings, supranote 3, at 261.

24.
See also Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 3; Permissible Self-Defense Targetings,
supra note 22. It should be noted that most self-defense responses to prior armed attacks will involve
the motive to prevent such attacks from continuing, but the existence of mixed motives will not limit the
permissibility of otherwise lawful measures of self-defense against an ongoing process of self-defense.
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25
peace. It is evident, therefore, that with respect to permissible targetings
the self-defense paradigm is different in some respects from the law of war
paradigm. In fact, the international law of self-defense allows the targeting
of persons who directly participate in armed attacks (DPAA) 26 wherever
such forms of direct participation occur. For example, as noted in another
writing, "significant armed attacks or attempted armed attacks have
emanated from parts of Yemen, thereby permitting self-defense targetings
of direct participants located in Yemen." 27
More recently, the United States targeted a United States national in
Yemen. The targeting of al-Awlaki was recognizably permissible under the
law of self-defense, if the Executive is correct that he had migrated from
being an al Qaeda propagandist and effective recruiter for al Qaeda to a
person who engaged in direct incitement to armed violence and a leader or
member of an operational team of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula that
continued to engage in planning armed attacks initiated in Yemen to take
place in the United States or on board a U.S. aircraft-such as the failed
Christmas underwear bomber attack in 2009 and the failed Fed-Ex and UPS
cargo bomb attacks in 2010.28 In such a case, he would have become a

25.

See, e.g., Self-Defense Targetings, supranote 3, at 250-52, 255, 258, 260, 279-80.

26. If there is direct participation in armed attacks over time with occasional interruption, one
wants to use a process approach and note whether direct participation occurs over a period of time, for
example, by using a movie camera instead of a rigid snap shot approach to inquiry that would merely
focus on whether the next attack is imminent instead of focusing on the fact that a process of direct
participation in attacks realistically never stopped. See also Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 3;
Permissible Self-Defense Targetings,supra note 22. One might even consider that those who directly
participate in armed attacks over time are those who demonstrate a continual armed attack function
(CAAF).
27.

PermissibleSelf-Defense Targetings,supra note 22, at 572 n. 18, 575.

28. Concerning such failed armed attacks, see for example, Permissible Self-Defense
Targetings,supra note 22, at 572 n.18, 575; Concerning AI-Awlaki's participation in armed attacks, see,
e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremonyfor the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at Fort Myer, Virginia, Daily Comp. Pres. Docs., DCPD-201100695, Sept. 30,
2011, at 1, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/30/remarks-presidentchange-office-chairman-joint-chiefs-staff-ceremony (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (He was "a leader of al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula . . . the leader of external operations for al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. In that role, he took the lead in planning and directing efforts to murder innocent
Americans," including the failed Christmas day 2009 aircraft bombing and the failed U.S. cargo plane
bombings in 2010.); Attorney General Eric Holder, Remarks As Prepared For Delivery By Attorney
General Eric Holder At Northwestern University School Of Law (Mar. 5, 2012) (The Christmas Day
bomber received "specific instructions [from al-Awlaki] to wait until the airplane was over the United
States before detonating his bomb."), availableat http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/05/ag-holders-nationalsecurity-speech-text (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Holder]; Ramsden, supra note 9, at 398400; Peter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2011, at
A9.
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direct participant in ongoing armed attacks (DPAA) against the United
States and its nationals and he would have been lawfully targetable under
the law of self-defense. Because the United States cannot be at war with al
Qaeda or its affiliates, the laws of war were not applicable in order to
permit the targeting of al-Awlaki as a civilian who was a direct participant
in hostilities. Moreover, there was no indication that al-Awlaki had been
directly participating in the real war in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan,
which would have made him targetable as a DPH under the laws of war
wherever he had been directly participating in such a war.
With respect to human rights and the human rights paradigm, human
rights law applies globally and in all social contexts. Yet, those who are
entitled to human rights vis-d-vis the United States must either be within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or within its actual power or
"effective control." 2 9 Al-Awlaki was not within such jurisdiction or control
at the time of his death. Moreover, if he had been, his human right to life
would have attached, but would have been a freedom from "arbitrary"
deprivation of life and, because he was lawfully targetable as a DPAA, his
death was recognizably not arbitrary.o
With respect to the nationality of the person being targeted, in the
context of a real war, it is irrelevant under the laws of war whether the
targetable direct participant in hostilities is a United States national.3 '
Similarly, it is irrelevant under the international law of self-defense whether
a direct participant in armed attacks is a United States national. Therefore,
29. See, e.g., Permissible Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 22, at 573, 581; Self-Defense
Targetings,supranote 3, at 264-66. It has been suggested that the test requiring that a person be within
the actual power or effective control of a state engaged in targeting should be interpreted in an expanded
fashion to include the "targeting or killing [ofJ an individual . . . as a form of exercise of control" and
that "the act of targeting" involves "some degree of effective control." Meagan S. Wong, Targeted
Killings and the International Legal Framework: With Particular Reference to the US Operation
against Osama bin Laden, II CHINESE J. INT'L L. 127, 159-60 (2012). In my opinion, this is an
unacceptable use of the word "control," much less "effective" control, because if a person has not been
captured, in certain contexts at least, the person can raise a weapon and shoot, run away to continue
attacks in the near future, quickly hide in a manner that prevents capture or killing. The fact that killing
is an outcome does not necessarily mean that the person killed was in the "effective control" of the
person engaged in the targeting. This is especially true if a drone used for targeting is at 40,000 feet
above the person killed. Also consider the circumstance in war where soldier X has aim at enemy
soldier Y who is about 20 meters away, but soldier Y does not indicate the she wishes to surrender and
falls to the ground rolling to her right and pulls out a pistol and kills soldier X (who had shot at soldier
Y but missed). Soldier X obviously did not have actual power or effective control over soldier Y.
30.
See Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 3, at 263-64 n.65, 269. Similarly, in the context
of a real war, the lawful killing of a DPH would not be "arbitrary."
See, e.g., id. at 262 n.60; Holder, supra note 28 ("[fIt's clear that United States citizenship
31.
alone does not make such individuals immune from targeting" either under the laws of war of the law of
self-defense.).
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under both the law of war and self-defense paradigms, there is no room for
an American exceptionalism with respect to the legality of targetings.3 2

32.
With respect to "due process" under the U.S. Constitution, it should be evident that if a
U.S. national is lawfully targetable abroad under the international laws of war or the international law of
self-defense the process that is due such a national is met by compliance with international legal
standards. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 519 (2004) ("We held that '[c]itizens who associate
themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction ...
[are] bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . .. the law of war. . . .' A

citizen, no less than an alien, can be 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States' . . . and
'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States. . . .' quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20,
37-38 (1942)); Holder, supranote 28 (addressing law of war principles to be considered with regard to
Fifth Amendment due process requirements). More generally, international law has been used as an aid
for interpreting provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(Human rights precepts used as an aid for interpreting the Eighth Amendment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 132-33
(1923) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (Use of international law to interpret the Eighteenth Amendment);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 el seq. (1893) (International legal principles support
interpretation of congressional power regarding exclusion and deportation of aliens); United States v.
Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1110 n.21 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370 (9th Cir.
1995) ("Principles of international law are 'useful as a rough guide' in determining ... due process")
(quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cir. 1990)); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450,
1463 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Gonzalez, 776 F.2d 931, 938-41 (1lth Cir. 1985); United States
v. Usama bin Laden, et al., 92 F.Supp.2d 189, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[Iqf the extraterritorial application
of a statute is justified by the protective principle [of customary international law regarding jurisdiction]
such application accords with due process."). See also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 125 (1814)
("In expounding . . . [the] Constitution, a construction ought not lightly to be admitted which would" not
be in conformity with or "fetter" discretion under customary international laws of war "which may
enable the government to apply to the enemy the rule that he applies to us."); United States v.
Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-76 (2d Cir. 1974) (due process inquiry "guided by" government's "illegal
conduct," which included violations of two treaties); Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F.Supp.2d 38, 5254 (D.D.C. 2000) (rejecting a due process-minimum contacts claim by Iraq with respect to alleged acts
of state sponsored terrorism "condemned by the international community," and implicating universal
jurisdiction, especially since international law provides "adequate warning of possible U.S. sanctions"
(quoting Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F.Supp. 1, 23 (D.D.C. 1998))); Ex parte Toscano, 208
F. 938, 942-44 (S.D. Cal. 1913) (Executive detention of persons from Mexico was appropriate under a
treaty and the treaty-based "duty devolves upon the President," "the President has full authority .. . and
it was and is his duty to execute said treaty provisions."); JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN DYKE &
LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 250-67 (West Group, 3d ed.,

2009) (cases regarding international law's enhancement of congressional power), 272-73 (cases
regarding international law's enhancement of presidential power); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL
LAW As LAW OF THE UNITED STATEs 205, 212, 218-22, 275-76 n.389-93 (Carolina Academic Press,
2d ed., 2003) (documenting judicial references to human rights in connection with the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th,
8th, 9th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments).
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IV. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF DISTINCTION, REASONABLE NECESSITY,
AND PROPORTIONALITY

In her article, Professor Valerie Epps aptly demonstrates why it is
necessary to attempt to comply with the principles of distinction among
persons, reasonable necessity, and proportionality with respect to lawful
targetings during an armed conflict, and she rightly demonstrates why there
can be no automatic or programed applications of what she terms the
"collateral damage rule" in terms of numbers of civilians killed in
proportion to numbers of combatants killed. In one of my writings, I have
noted that these three principles also provide useful guidance with respect
to methods and means of self-defense outside the context of war, because
all measures of self-defense must comply with the same general
principles.34
Articles 48 and 50-51 of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
reflect treaty-based and customary international legal requirements
concerning necessity and proportionality. These include:
a)

b)
c)

The need to distinguish between civilians (who are
protected from attack "unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities") and lawful military targets (the
so-called principle of distinction);
The prohibition of attacks directed at protected civilians or
civilian objects as such; and
The prohibition of indiscriminate attacks.

A customary prohibition related to the prohibition of "indiscriminate"
attacks is the more general prohibition of unnecessary death, injury, or
suffering during war, 1 one that is also partly reflected in the duty set forth
in Geneva Protocol I to avoid attacks "expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life . .. which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and

33. See Valerie Epps, The Death of the CollateralDamage Rule in Modern Warfare, Suffolk
University Law School Research Paper No. 11-39, Sept. 16, 2011, at 3, available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/paperscfin?abstractid=1929029 (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
34. See, e.g., O'Connell, Remarks, supra note 19, at 591-92 nn. 40, 42; Self-Defense
Targetings,supra, note 3, at 244, 245 n. 19, 269 n.81, 270; PermissibleSelf-Defense Targetings,supra
note 22, at 572, 574-76.
35.

See id.

36. See, e.g., ICL, supra note 5, at 639, 679-80, 697-99 (The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) considers this customary principle to be reflected in what it terms the "principle of
humanity."); Melzer, Interpretive Guidance, supranote 20, at 79-80.
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direct military advantage anticipated."3 7 Some "incidental" loss of civilian
life might be foreseeable but still permissible if the requirements of
reasonable necessity and proportionality are met. As explained in United
States v. List 8 during the subsequent Nuremberg proceedings, "military
necessity . . . permits the destruction of life of armed enemies and other

persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable."39
As noted in another writing, with respect to a contextually attentive
application of the principles in a given context: 40
[Wlhen applying principles of reasonable necessity and
proportionality with respect to use of drones for targeting, one
should consider all relevant features of context. Among
appropriate considerations are: (1) identification of the target
(e.g., as a DPAA, combatant, fighter with a continuous combat
function, or DPH as opposed to a non-targetable civilian); (2) the
importance of the target; (3) whether equally effective alternative
methods of targeting or capture exist; (4) the presence, proximity,
and number of civilians who are not targetable; (5) whether some
civilians are voluntary or coerced human shields; (6) the
precision in targeting that can obtain; and (7) foreseeable
consequences with respect to civilian death, injury, or suffering.41
37. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 41(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/volume-1 125-1-17512English.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Epps, supra note 33, at 3 (directly
related to what Professor Epps describes as the collateral damage rule).
38.

United States v. List, et al. (The Southeast Hostages Case), 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS

BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 757

(1950), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdflNT war-criminalsVol-XI.pdf (last
visited Feb. 20, 2012).
39. Id. at 1253-54. See also Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
the Field, General Orders No. 100, April 24, 1863 (the Lieber Code), art. 15 ("Military necessity admits
of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies and of other persons whose destruction is
incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war"); id. art. 22 (there must be a "distinction
between the private individual . .. and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms" and "the unarmed
citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit"); id.
art. 155 ("noncombatants ... [are] unarmed citizens. . . ."); Melzer, Interpretive Guidance, supra note
22, at 37 (noting that civilians might risk "incidental death or injury" because of "[tiheir activities or
location."); TARGETED KILLING, supranote 8, at 278-86, 297-98.
40.

PermissibleSelf-Defense Targetings,supra note 22, at 575-76.

41.
See, e.g., Self-Defense Targetings, supra note 3, at 275-77. See also Amos N. Guiora,
Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. [J. NAT'L SEC. L.] 5034, 5042-5048
(2011); Amos N. Guiora, Not "By All Means Necessary:" A ComparativeFrameworkfor Post-9/11
Approaches to Counterterrorism,42 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 273, 278-82 (2009); Afsheen John
Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Carefor CIA Targeted Killing, 2011
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As a legal expert with the ICRC avers, part of a nuanced
contextual inquiry should involve consideration of "the actual
level of control exercised over the situation by the operating
State" and an appropriate consideration of "required intensity or
urgency may" actually involve "a generous standard of
'reasonableness' in traditional battlefield confrontations."4 2 For
this reason and because of other features of context that can be
relevant to nuanced application of the principle of reasonable
necessity, there should be no rigid rule that would require ground
verification of target selection and engagement when ordinary
civilians are known to be nearby. As the ICRC expert added
more generally, there should be inquiry into qualitative,
quantitative, and temporal necessity and whether methods and
means to be used "contribute effectively to the achievement of a
concrete and direct military advantage . . . without unreasonably

increasing the security risk of the operating forces or the civilian
population."A3

V. THE WAR IN LIBYA
It is evident that during future armed conflicts in which developed

states participate one will see an increasing use of robots for various
purposes, including use of weaponized drones for targeting. The recent war
in Libya is an example of an international armed conflict that involved
United States and NATO use of guided missiles, drone targetings, fighter

aircraft targetings, and various other traditional weaponry. It would be
interesting to identify the number of deaths and injuries of civilians who
were not targetable as direct participants in hostilities with respect to each
use of guided missiles, drone targetings, and fighter aircraft targetings."
Which weapon systems allowed greater compliance with principles of
distinction, reasonable necessity, and proportionality? It may be that drone
targetings were generally more precise and caused less incidental death,
injury, and suffering. In any event, weaponized drones are capable of more
precise targetings of lawful military targets.45

U. ILL. L. REv. 1201, 1222, 1228-38 (2011) (addressing a U.S. military six-step decisional and review
process and suggesting relevant criteria and considerations with respect to targetings by CIA personnel).
42.

See TARGETED KILLING, supra note 8, at 397-98.

43.

Id.

Claims have been made regarding unspoken civilian casualties. See, e.g., C.J. Chivers &
44.
Eric Schmitt, Confronting NATO's Careful War, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 17, 2011, at 1.
See, e.g., Drake, supra note 14, at 637-40, 642-45; Permissible Self-Defense Targetings,
45.
supra note 22, at 572-73 n.20.
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Quite clearly, during the war in Libya there were also direct attacks on
civilians and civilian populated areas committed by other actors that were
violations of the laws of war. One of the reasons why the United Nations
Security Council authorized the use of armed force in Libya involved the
fact that civilians had been targeted in violation of international law,
especially by armed forces of the Qaddafi government, and a United
Nations authorized use of force had become necessary in order "to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in" Libya.46
The Security Council's authorization is actually an important
reaffirmation of the need to comply with the principles of distinction,
reasonable necessity, and proportionality or, as some prefer, the collateral
damage rule.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article has provided detailed disclosure why the United States
cannot be at war with al Qaeda under international law. Attention has been
paid to traditional customary international legal criteria concerning
belligerent and insurgent status, newer criteria for an insurgency under
Geneva Protocol II, and an ICTY preference for lower levels of armed
conflict in order to demonstrate that the existence of an armed conflict with
al Qaeda, as such, is not possible.
Nonetheless, targetings of members of al Qaeda in the theatre of a real
war with the Taliban is lawful under the laws of war if members of al
Qaeda directly participate in hostilities. Moreover, targeting of members of
al Qaeda can be permissible under the law of self-defense if they are
directly participating in armed attacks. As the article explains, the targeting
of U.S. national Anwar al-Awalki in Yemen was permissible under the selfdefense paradigm. Under either the law of war paradigm or the selfdefense paradigm, general principles of distinction, reasonable necessity,
and proportionality must be followed.

46. U.N. S.C. Res. 1973, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://
(last visited
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENINI1/268/39/PDF/NI126839.pdfOpenElement
Feb. 20, 2012). In addition to the U.N. Security Council authorization to use all necessary measures of
protective force, during later stages in the armed conflict there was a change in the international legal
status of the Libyan rebel-insurgents to belligerents who consented to and welcomed U.S. and NATO
uses of force. Still later, as the Libyan National Transitional Council gained recognition as the
legitimate representative of the Libyan people, its consent provided additional independent legitimacy
for use of force to support regime change, provide self-determination assistance to the Libyan people,
and participate in collective self-defense against continuous armed attacks by remnants of the Qaddafi
regime. With respect to the legitimacy of self-determination assistance in certain contexts, see, for
examplError! Main Document Only.e, Jordan J. Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in
Afghanistan, Iraq, andBeyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533, 547-48 (2002).

